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Symbolic Values, Value Formation and Interpersonal Relations
*
 
Interpersonal relations are shaped by the judgements associated with the social categories 
that individuals perceive in their social contacts. I develop a model of how those judgments 
form based on a theory of symbolic values. The model depicts the interaction between two 
values, one associated with an inherited ethnic trait (“nationality”) and one with an 
endogenous achievement trait (“income”). Individuals who are less likely to achieve are 
predicted to invest more value on nationalism and to have hostile relations with immigrants. 
Multiple equilibria are possible and better schooling may eliminate equilibria with xenophobia. 
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Well-being and interpersonal relations in the economic sphere” in Venice, June 12, 2009. I thank 
Holger Lüthen and Frank Neher for excellent research assistance. 1 Introduction
Interpersonal relations have an idiosyncratic and a common component. On the one hand,
any interpersonal relation is the product of a unique history of interactions between con-
crete human beings and of their memories of that history. On the other hand, interper-
sonal relations unfold in a socially constructed mental frame: individuals encounter each
other as carriers of traits whose saliency and meaning are to a large extent socially deter-
mined. People ￿rst meet as men and women, white and black, subordinate and boss, and
only after - if their communication deepens - as individualized persons. First encounters1
are governed by the expectations and judgements associated with the social categories
- like gender, race, and occupation - that individuals perceive in their social contacts.
Those judgements heavily a⁄ect the utility derived from interpersonal relations. They
may determine whether a ￿rst encounter begins with a smile or with raised eyebrows,
with deference or disdain, with a handshake or an erected ￿nger. And the quality of a
￿rst encounter may determine whether the relation continues and on which track. Since
social judgments carry such heavy consequences, people￿ s search for personal contacts as
well as their e⁄orts to avoid them, along with the resulting network of relations, depend
on the prevailing stereotypes associated with social categories.
What drives people￿ s evaluation of social categories? The formation of values and atti-
tudes is the object of longstanding lines of research in sociology, psychology, anthropology
and even biology. Economic analysis based on the traditional rational-choice paradigm
can contribute novel insights into those issues and thereby enrich our understanding of
economic phenomena like the accumulation of human capital, the persistence of inequal-
ity, and long-run growth. To substantiate that claim, I will ￿rst sketch the main ideas
of a theory of symbolic values that was proposed by Corneo and Jeanne (2009a, 2009b).
That theory o⁄ers an economic perspective on value formation and can be utilized to
study the social determination of interpersonal relations. Based on it, I will then develop
a model of the relations between two di⁄erent ethnic groups in a country: natives and
immigrants. That model o⁄ers an explanation for the existence of xenophobia and for its
interplay with the ability to invest in human capital. Finally, the model￿ s predictions will
be confronted with empirical evidence obtained from three large representative surveys.
1Gui (2005) introduced this terminology to describe those peculiar acts of production and consumption
that characterize interpersonal relations from an economic viewpoint.
12 Theory of symbolic values
Some personal characteristics, like nationality and professional activity, seem to be in-
vested with symbolic values by human beings. These values determine the esteem that
individuals receive from other people as well as their self-esteem. Those values are sym-
bolic in the sense that they are immaterial: they a⁄ect the well-being of individuals - so
they are values - but without a⁄ecting their consumption of material goods - so they are
symbolic.
A system of symbolic values is a set of judgments about salient characteristics. The
theory of symbolic values aims at explaining the variation of those judgments across social
groups and single individuals. For instance, individuals in a given country may attach a
very di⁄erent value to descending from an aristocratic family or to being divorced. They
may attach a di⁄erent value to tax evasion: an individual may view it as immoral, another
one may view it as just clever. Endorsed symbolic values determine how one feels when
having those salient characteristics and how one behaves towards those who have those
characteristics.
The theory of symbolic values is based on four main assumptions:
1) Evaluative attitude. Individuals pass judgments of approval, admiration, etc.,
and their opposite upon certain traits, acts, and outcomes.
Those judgements are determined by an individual￿ s value system, which is a way to
allocate value to bundles of judgeable characteristics. Formally, the value system of an
individual is a function that maps an exogenous set of judgeable types onto the real line.
2) Social approbativeness. Individuals desire a good opinion of oneself on the part
of other people.
The relevant human environment for approbativeness may be an individual￿ s family,
friends, colleagues, neighbors, or society at large. The desired ways of thinking may be
in a scale that distinguishes contempt, indi⁄erence, interest, approval, praise, admiration,
and veneration.
3) Self-approbativeness. Individuals have a desire for self-esteem.
This desire for a pleasing idea of oneself presupposes self-consciousness. Humans are
both actors and spectators of what they do. Since they are evaluative beings, they also
judge themselves.
4) Consistency. The standards of approbation or disapprobation which the individual
applies to himself are the same as those which he applies to other people.
This postulate corresponds to the rule of judging yourself as you would judge of others.
While psychologists have identi￿ed ways of self-deception, in the main individuals are
subject to the control by the logic of consistency. It is di¢ cult to systematically approve
2in oneself acts which one condemns in others, and when one does so, his fellows are quick
to point out the inconsistency.
Value systems arise within various socialization structures. Symbolic values are trans-
mitted in a cultural process by agencies of socialization like the family, the peers, and the
media. Parents are a main agency of socialization and the theory of symbolic values has
been utilized to study how altruistic parents socialize their children in various contexts.
The study of purposive socialization in economic models has been pioneered by Bisin
and Verdier (1998, 2000). In their models, vertical socialization, along with random
imitation, determines the long-term distribution of cultural traits in the population. The
theory of symbolic values mainly di⁄ers from Bisin and Verdier￿ s one in two respects. First,
Bisin and Verdier assume that parents want their children to have the same cultural trait
as themselves. They motivate this assumption by the possibility of "imperfect empathy"
on the side of parents. This means that parents evaluate their children￿ s actions using
their (the parents￿ ) preferences. In the theory of symbolic values, parents choose the
value system of their children so as to maximize the child￿ s utility.2 Second, the objects
that are transmitted from parents to children are modeled in di⁄erent ways. Whereas in
Bisin and Verdier￿ s theory parents transmit a preference trait, in ours they transmit a
value system. The essential property of a value system is that, taking it in conjunction
with an individual￿ s attributes, it determines the esteem enjoyed by the individual. In
the theory of symbolic values, individuals have preferences over esteem and the usual list
of consumption goods. The advantage of modeling socialization to a value system rather
than to a preference trait is that one keeps preferences ￿xed, so that normative analysis
based on the Pareto criterion is possible. A cost of this modeling approach is that one
has to add esteem to the standard arguments of the utility function. This is also true of
Bisin and Verdier￿ s theory, which introduces the o⁄spring￿ s preference parameter in the
parent￿ s utility function.
3 A model of immigrants-natives relations
I will now apply the theory of symbolic values to study the interpersonal relations be-
tween immigrants and natives.3 Beliefs in the superiority of one￿ s own ethnicity may have
serious implications for the relations between immigrants and natives and for a coun-
2Imperfect altruism could easily be incorporated in the theory of symbolic values. Suppose that
parents also care about the esteem that they receive from their children. Since the latter depends on the
value that the child attaches to the parent￿ s traits, the parent has an incentive to bias the socialization
of her child in favor of her own traits.
3Bisin et al. (2008) and Della Giusta and Hashimzade (2009) o⁄er related models of cultural assimi-
lation of immigrants. The model in the current paper can also be interpreted as one of racial relations.
3try￿ s economic performance. Immigrants constitute a sizeable share of the overall world
population and often belong to the most vulnerable strata of the population. Negative
stereotypes about immigrants reduce their chances in the labor market and their quality
of everyday life, including life at schools and in workplaces. Natives￿hostility may foster
negative stereotyping by immigrants with respect to the national majority, giving rise to
a mental arm race in terms of prejudices. Sometimes that race turns into episodes of vio-
lence and it often a⁄ects political outcomes.4 From an economic viewpoint, chauvinistic
attitudes may be a formidable obstacle to the immigrants￿integration in the domestic
economy and the recognition of their talents. Natives￿hostility may induce immigrants
to cluster together in neighborhoods and schools, where unfavorable peer e⁄ects prevent
both cognitive and noncognitive abilities to develop at their potential. In this fashion,
xenophobia may generate a lasting negative impact on innovation and economic growth.
In the sequel, a formal model of immigrant-natives relations is developed that allows
one to dissect the role of value formation and the interplay between symbolic values and
economic outcomes.5
3.1 Assumptions
Consider a model economy populated by a continuum of atomistic individuals i 2 [0;1].
Individuals have a common utility function but di⁄er with respect to their nationality,
ability, and family background. A fraction ￿ of the population consists of immigrants, a
4By way of an example, in Germany right-wing extremist parties could bene￿t from mounting xeno-
phobia and anti-Semitism in some recent regional elections; as reported by Siedler (2008), between 1990
and 2005 the number of right-wing extremists in Germany more than doubled. Anti-immigrant feeling
was a key factor in the electoral success of the National Front Party in the 2002 French election; as
simulated by Roemer and Van der Straeten (2005), xenophobia substantially reduced the redistributive
content of the parties￿electoral platforms. Historically, feelings of superiority of own nation and race
seem to have been essential ingredients for the development of fascism, colonialism and imperialism. In
turn, fascist leaders used their rethoric to foster racial and ethnic divisions.
5In the Beckerian tradition, racism is an exogenous preference that implies discriminatory behavior
based on race. The main insight of Becker is the role of market competition. Since racial discrimination
is costly to the discriminator, free market competition drives racists out of the market. Thus, adding
an evolutionary twist, thanks to markets, race-based hostility is bound to disappear. Of course, this is
subject to caveats concerning the possibility of economic rents in the long run. In any case, it may take
a while to arrive at the steady state and meanwhile preferences for race may persist. This raises the
question of their cause. An illuminating but partial answer is provided by the approach of statistical
discrimination. Groups that are readily identi￿able by observers - e.g. by the color of their skin - may
be known to be characterized by some average behavior. Observers use that piece of information along
with other signals to forecast others￿behavior. An example is when natives assign a relatively high
probability to the event that an immigrant commits a crime. Hostility towards immigrants is explained
as a precautionary attitude to avoid being victim of crimes. However, such attitudes often arise in
absence of any compelling information about the statistical relationship between ethnicity and crime. In
controlled experiments, Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) found no evidence of statistical discrimination and
much evidence in support of mistaken ethnic stereotypes.
4fraction 1 ￿ ￿ consists of natives; for simplicity, all immigrants are assumed to share a
common nationality. Ability is summarized by the pair (￿;￿) and family background by
the pair (￿;￿), to be explained later. All individuals consume one homogeneous good,
used as the numeraire. Each individual faces the following sequence of events: ￿rst, the
individual exerts e⁄ort in order to shape his value system; this can be interpreted as a
benevolent parent socializing her child. Second, the individual, given his values, decides
how much e⁄ort to exert in order to achieve in economic terms. Third, Nature determines
the individual achievement levels; individuals consume according to their achievements
and obtain esteem and utility from interpersonal relations according to how their charac-
teristics are valued in society.
Material Outcomes
I posit that achievement is de￿ned in terms of the income level obtained by the in-
dividual and consider two possible outcomes, a high income level wH and a low income
level wL. Achieving is a random event which depends on an individual￿ s ability or talent
and his e⁄ort, given such exogenous circumstances as the quality of schooling. Denot-
ing by e(i) individual i￿ s non-negative e⁄ort level, the probability to succeed is given by
Prfw(i) = wHg = ￿(i) + ￿(i)e(i); where parameters are both non-negative. Parameter
￿ stands for those individual capabilities that increase achievement independently of an
individual￿ s e⁄ort; ￿ measures the extent to which individual achievement is responsive to
individual e⁄ort.6 E⁄ort is costly, and its cost to the individual is specialized to e(i)2=2!,
where ! is a preference parameter of the utility function.
Let ￿ denote the fraction of achievers. Their wage wH(￿) is assumed to satisfy w0
H(￿) ￿
0, while w0
L(￿) ￿ 0, with wH(1) > wL(0). The ￿rst two inequalities can be seen as a
reduced-form model for a labor market determination of the returns to human capital.
Value systems.
Individuals have value systems de￿ned over two attributes: nationality n 2 f0;1g and
achievement a 2 f0;1g. Let n = 1 denote domestic nationality and a = 1 denote high
income. The value attached to the trait combination an by individual i is measured by a
non-negative index van(i). The collection of the four van(i), one for each type, describes





van(i) = 1: (1)
Value systems are determined by an exogenous factor that is common to all individuals
with the same nationality (possibly the same for both nationalities) and by an endogenous
6Both parameters may also capture the quality of the environment, e.g. the quality of schooling.
5idiosyncratic factor. The common factor is the reference value system fb vang for nationals
and fe vang for immigrants. The reference value system mirrors public values as put forward
by collective discourse. They are the outcome of a whole history of ideas and taken as
exogenously given. By way of an example, public values that stress the fundamentally
equal worth of all individuals, independently of their traits, may be captured by b van = 1=4
for all a and n. Public values that stress the superiority of own country of origin may
instead give rise to b va1 > b va0 and e va0 > e va1; public values that stress the special worth of
individual accomplishments may induce b v1n > b v0n and e v1n > e v0n.
The idiosyncratic factor captures how an individual is socialized. I concentrate on
vertical socialization by benevolent parents, thus abstracting from horizontal and oblique
socialization. If parents do not exert e⁄ort, individuals are assumed to endorse the refer-
ence value system of their nationality. By exerting e⁄orts, parents can shift their child￿ s
values away from the reference value system. This captures the malleability of character
during childhood and early adolescence that has been identi￿ed by research on human
development.7
Parents who invest in their children￿ s values may in￿ uence the relative value that













va0(i). Parents￿in￿ uence depends on the resources that they invest in
socialization. Let ￿a(i) and ￿n(i) respectively denote a parent￿ s investment in achievement-
orientation and in nationalism; the resulting value system for a domestic citizen is given
by:
v11(i) = maxfminfb v11 + ￿a(i) + ￿n(i);1g;0g
v01(i) = maxfminfb v01 ￿ ￿a(i) + ￿n(i);1g;0g
v10(i) = maxfminfb v10 + ￿a(i) ￿ ￿n(i);1g;0g
v00(i) = maxfminfb v00 ￿ ￿a(i) ￿ ￿n(i);1g;0g:
Analogous expressions hold for immigrants after substituting b van with the corresponding
7See e.g. Cunha and Heckman (2009) for an excellent survey.
6e van.8 Without signi￿cant loss of generality, I assume that parameters are such that parents
choose internal values, i.e. van(i) 2 (0;1) for all a, n and i.
Instilling values is assumed to be costly for parents. First, there is a cost caused by the
overall amount of socialization e⁄ort exerted by parents; this cost increases with j￿a(i)j +
j￿n(i)j. Second, parents incur a speci￿c cost for manipulating the value attached to each
trait, achievement and nationality. Those costs depend on a parent￿ s skill in transmitting
values. Parents whose own value system attaches a large value to achievement must spend
less e⁄ort in order to obtain a given increase in her children￿ s valuation of achievement
as compared to parents who attach little value to achievement. Similarly, nationalistic
parents have a comparative advantage in transmitting an attachment to own nation. For
simplicity, I assume that total costs incurred by an individual￿ s parent to socialize her










Parameters ￿ and ￿ may be thougth of as capturing both the values of the parents
and the intrinsic strength of the national value system: the weaker parents￿valuation of a
given trait and the more convincing the reference value system of their group, the larger
are the costs to inculcate di⁄erent values, and the small are ￿ and ￿.
Utility function.
Individuals care about consumption and esteem, in addition to the e⁄ort costs incurred
when socializing their children and acquiring human capital. Preferences are additively
















The ￿rst term on the r.h.s. captures utility from consumption, which is given by the
individual￿ s wage. The second one captures utility from self-esteem. An individual￿ s self-
esteem is the esteem in which he holds his type: if an individual i is the type an, his
self-esteem is given by van(i). The third term of the utility function captures utility from
social interactions. Independently of their nationality, adult individuals are randomly
matched into pairs.9 At each encounter they exchange courtesy or hostility according to
their traits and values. Courtesy and hostility are relational goods that are not exchanged
8Notice that an immigrant￿ s parent who wants to increase the value attached by her child to own
nationality chooses ￿n < 0.
9An alternative assumption is social segregation, where individuals have a higher probability to meet
somebody of the same nationality. This may be a better assumption if one is to analyze racial relations
in US ghettos. That assumption generates the possibility of diverging conformist e⁄ects in values and
behavior across races.
7through markets but through social interactions. I refer to them as the social esteem
enjoined by individuals. The esteem that an individual receives from a social contact
depends on the value attached by his social contact on the individual￿ s type. I assume
that nationality is perfectly observed by social contacts, while achievement is observed
with probability 1￿￿. The expected social esteem received by a native with achievement
level a is therefore given by














where b a is the fraction of achievers in the native population. A symmetric de￿nition of
socv(i) applies for migrants.
The preference parameters ￿ and ￿ are strictly positive and capture the strength of
value concerns.
Equilibrium.
An equilibrium is a situation in which each agent chooses his e⁄ort levels to shape
his values and to build human capital so as to maximize his expected utility, taking the
choices of all other agents as given. To shorten the exposition, I only consider parameter
constellations that give rise to equilibria that are interior with respect to the probability
to achieve, i.e. such that ￿ + ￿e 2 (0;1).
3.2 Individual optimization
At the family level, both the wage structure and levels of social esteem are taken as
exogenouos. A native family maximizes

















is a shorthand for the costs incurred by the agent as a function of his three control
variables. The immigrants￿decision problem is similar and will not be explicitly presented.
As a ￿rst step, it is instructive to discuss the determination of the child￿ s achievement
level. When the child selects his e⁄ort, his value system has already crystallized, inducing
reduced-form preferences for e⁄ort summarized by the objective function




8The ￿rst-order condition for an interior maximum entails
e
￿ = !￿[(wH ￿ wL) + ￿(v11 ￿ v01) + ￿(socv11 ￿ socv01)]: (5)
Thus, an individual￿ s expected achievement ￿+￿e￿ is driven by four factors: his ability, as
proxied by ￿ and ￿, his character, as proxied by v11 ￿v01, pecuniary incentives, wH ￿wL,
and social incentives, socv11￿socv01. As shown by (5), values transmitted to the individual
by society and his parents generate an incentive e⁄ect: the individual￿ s e⁄ort is strictly
increasing with v11 ￿ v01 = b v11 ￿ b v01 + 2￿a. The intuition is simple: the larger the value
attached to achievement, the larger is the self-esteem obtained from achieving relative to
the self-esteem in case of failure, and the stronger is the incentive for the individual to
exert e⁄ort.
When parents socialize their children, they anticipate the incentive e⁄ect of value
transmission. The result of their maximization exercise is described in the following10
Proposition 1 A unique optimal strategy always exists and has ￿
￿
n > 0 in case of natives
and ￿
￿
n < 0 in case of immigrants. Depending on parameter values, one of the following
cases occur at the optimum: 1) ￿
￿
a < 0, e￿ = 0; 2) ￿
￿
a < 0, e￿ > 0; 3) ￿
￿
a = 0, e￿ > 0; 4)
￿
￿
a > 0, e￿ > 0.
Parents have an incentive to invest in nationalism because it has a positive in￿ uence
on the child￿ s self-esteem for sure and a small investment causes negligible costs. Instead,
parents do not necessarily invest in the achievement-orientation of their children. The
welfare impact of investing in achievement orientation can be decomposed into a mechan-
ical and a behavioral e⁄ect. The mechanical e⁄ect is the expected change in self-esteem
caused by attaching more value to achievement. Its expected return is positive if and
only if the probability for the child to be an achiever (given by ￿ + ￿e) is larger than the
probability to be a loser (given by 1￿￿ ￿￿e). The behavioral e⁄ect is the change in the
marginal return to e⁄ort. Increasing the achievement-orientation of the child generates
an incentive to exert more e⁄ort because the achievement orientation increases the loss of
self-esteem in case of failure. If the probability to achieve is low, the mechanical e⁄ect may
dominate and the parent may decide to invest to decrease the achievement orientation of
her child (￿
￿
a < 0). If the probability is high, the mechanical e⁄ect and the behavioral
e⁄ect may reinforce each other and the parent may choose to enhance the achievement
orientation of her child (￿
￿
a > 0).
10Proofs of all propositions appear in the Appendix. In order for the maximization problems to be
well-behaved, parameters must satisfy
￿ + ￿ + ￿ > 4￿￿
2￿
2!(￿ + ￿);
which I assume to be the case throught the paper.
93.3 General equilibrium
At the general-equilibrium level, the income levels of achievers and losers and the social
esteem of each type are endogenous. The wage determination follows the usual logic of
scarcity: the wage di⁄erential is given by
￿w = wH ((1 ￿ ￿)b a + ￿e a) ￿ wL((1 ￿ ￿)b a + ￿e a);
which is decreasing in the fraction of achievers in the two groups, b a and e a.
The di⁄erence in social esteem between achievers and losers reads
￿ d socv = (1 ￿ ￿)
h
(1 ￿ ￿)(b v11 ￿ b v01 + 2b ￿a) + ￿(e v11 ￿ e v01 + 2e ￿a)
i
for natives and
￿ g socv = (1 ￿ ￿)
h
(1 ￿ ￿)(b v10 ￿ b v00 + 2b ￿a) + ￿(e v10 ￿ e v00 + 2e ￿a)
i
for immigrants, where b ￿a and e ￿a are the average investments in achievement orientation
in the two groups. Those average investments increase the social esteem of the achievers
and decrease the social esteem of the losers, and hence raise the esteem di⁄erential.
The following fact can be established:
Proposition 2 A general equilibrium always exists. Multiple equilibria are possible if
￿ < 1 and ￿ is su¢ ciently large.
Multiple equilibria are interesting as they point out the possibility of a drastic ef-
fect from improved schooling. In case of multiple stable equilibria, a low-achievement-
orientation, low-e⁄ort equilibrium coexists with a high-achievement-orientation, high-
e⁄ort equilibrium. Then, a small schooling reform that marginally increases children￿ s
abilities (￿;￿) may eliminate an equilibrium with low achievement orientation, and there-
fore low social esteem to achievers, and make the economy jump to an achievement-
oriented one, where achievers obtain a high level of social esteem. In this case, output
grows and the skill wage di⁄erential wH ￿ wL decreases because of the increase in the
fraction of achievers.
The conditions for equilibrium multiplicity can be explained as follows. Parents￿so-
cialization e⁄orts generate an externality because their children￿ s values determine how
others fare in social interactions. Multiplicity arises if those externalities induce other
parents to change their socialization e⁄orts. An increase of achievement orientation for
some children increases the social esteem received by achievers as compared to losers; this
10strengthens the incentive for other children to exert e⁄ort, hence their probability to suc-
ceed increases. As a consequence, their parents have an incentive to raise the achievement
orientation of their children, i.e. a bandwagon e⁄ect of increasing achievement orientation
sets in. In order for this cumulative causation to occur, an increase of achievement orien-
tation must e⁄ectively increase the esteem received by achievers relative to that received
by losers, socv1n ￿ socv0n. This is only possible if achievement is observable (￿ < 1). If
achievement is private information, all natives get the same social esteem, independently
of their achievement, all immigrants get the same social esteem, independently of their
achievement, and social esteem has no behavioral e⁄ect.
In order for that cumulative causation to generate multiple equilibria, utility must
respond strongly enough to changes in social esteem. If a low-achievement-orientation,
low-e⁄ort economy is an equilibrium, a high-achievement-orientation, high-e⁄ort economy
can also be an equilibrium only if the gain of social esteem of achievers in the latter case
compensates in utility terms the associated higher e⁄ort cost and lower income gain. This
requires ￿ to be su¢ ciently large.11
3.4 Predictions for nationalism
While natives and immigrants have similar incentives to shape values about achievement,
they have diametrically opposed incentives with respect to nationalism. Indeed, two
individuals that only di⁄er with respect to their nationality optimally choose opposite
levels of ￿n; those magnitudes determine the di¢ dence that they experience when they
interact. Hence, investments in nationalism may be seen as proxies for interethnic con￿ ict
or inversely related to the quality of social interactions between natives and immigrants.12
In the current model, nationalism can be predicted by ability. The following result is
stated for natives and an equivalent one holds true for immigrants.
Proposition 3 Increasing ￿ gradually moves the optimal strategy from con￿guration 1 to
2 to 3 to 4 as of Proposition 1. The correlation between natives￿nationalism and ability is
@￿￿
n
@￿ > 0 in con￿gurations 1 and 2,
@￿￿
n
@￿ = 0 in con￿guration 3, and
@￿￿
n
@￿ < 0 in con￿guration
4.
In con￿gurations 1 and 2 the ability parameter ￿ is very low and parents invest to
decrease the value attached to achievement (￿
￿
a < 0) in order to raise the child￿ s future
11A similar logic explains the existence of ghetto cultures, where social esteem is obtained in some
groups not from achieving in terms of personal income but from achieving in other dimensions, e.g.
sexual prowess; see Anderson (1999).
12This is consistent with a line of thougth that goes back to Voltaire and the Frankfurt sociological
school and that purports that national pride implies ethnic prejudice. For a recent, more di⁄erentiated,
assessment, see de Figueiredo and Elkins (2003).
11self-esteem. In those parameter regions, when ￿ grows, parents become less sure that the
child will be a loser. Then, an increase of ￿ leads them to make ￿
￿
a less negative, i.e. they
come closer to their group￿ s reference values: parents￿socialization e⁄orts as expressed
by j￿
￿
aj decrease. As a consequence, the marginal costs of investing in nationalism become
lower. This leads parents to increase ￿
￿
n.
A further increase of ￿ moves the optimal strategy into con￿guration 3. This region
is characterized by a corner solution with respect to achievement orientation, i.e. ￿
￿
a = 0:
the agent endorses the valuation of achievement given by the reference value system of
his nationality. This is the parameter region where nationalism reaches its peak since
parents can devote their entire socialization e⁄orts to it: no e⁄ort is devoted to a⁄ect
the achievement orientation of children. This occurs because the ability of the child is
perceived to be insu¢ cient to make achievement a likely outcome.
If ￿ crosses some threshold, parents invest in achievement values (￿
￿
a > 0) and con-
￿guration 4 occurs. In this region, the complementarity between socialization and child￿ s
e⁄ort sets in. An increase in ￿ leads parents to invest more value in achievement, which
increases e⁄ort, which increases the probability to succeed, which makes investing in
achievement even more appealing. The ensuing increase in the marginal costs of social-
ization leads parents to decrease their investment in nationalism. An increase in child￿ s
ability makes therefore parents subtitute nationalism with achievement orientation.
The comparative statics of ￿ can be explained along similar lines. In con￿guration
1, e￿ = 0 so that ￿ does not matter. In con￿gurations 2, 3 and 4 the e⁄ect from ￿ is
qualitatively identical to the one from ￿.
In the most general case, ability entertains a hump-shaped relationship with national-
istic attitudes. At very low levels of ability - such that e￿ = 0 and/or ￿
￿
a ￿ 0 - nationalism
is increasing with ability. At intermediate levels, nationalism peaks and small changes in
ability have no e⁄ect on it. At higher levels of ability, nationalism continuously declines
with ability.
To the extent that ￿ and ￿ do not only mirror genetic traits but also capture the qual-
ity of schooling, Proposition 3 generates a novel insight into education policy. Schooling
may have repercussions beyond the skill level of the population: it may also a⁄ect how
parents socialize their children and how those children interact with immigrants. More
e¢ cient schooling may increase the level of human capital of the next generation because
it strengthens the incentive for parents to tilt their children￿ s character away from com-
placency and towards conscientiosness and perseverance. In this way, better schooling
may have an impact on nationalism and xenophobia, reducing them if school quality is
such that con￿guration 4 of Proposition 1 applies.
124 Corroborating evidence
The theoretical model suggests that ability is an explanatory factor of nationalistic at-
titude. According to Proposition 3, there is an inverted-U relationship between the two
variables: there can exist ability levels that are so low that nationalism increases with
ability but as soon as some intermediate ability level is reached, nationalism is predicted
to decrease with ability. In what follows, I examine that prediction in three data sets:
the German DJI Youth Survey, the "National Identity 2003" module of the International
Social Survey Programme (ISSP), and the World Value Survey (WVS). In those three
surveys, an individual￿ s ability can be measured by the individual￿ s educational attain-
ment. An individual￿ s nationalism can be recovered from the answer given to the following
question: "How proud are you of being [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]?". Respondents
choose from "Very proud", "Somewhat proud", Not very proud", "Not proud at all".
The answer to that question is arguably a reliable indicator of an individual￿ s self-esteem
derived from own nationality.
4.1 German youth
The German DJI Youth Survey is a repeated cross-sectional survey which was carried out
in 1992, 1997 and 2003. About 20,000 young adults aged 16-29 were interviewed and the
survey was designed to be representative of the total German population in that age range.
Focusing on young people, it is especially suitable for testing the proposed theoretical
model since reported values are not yet a⁄ected by the individuals￿experience of adult
life. Individual ability, measured by a respondent￿ s highest school degree, is available
in three categories: "No degree or secondary general school degree"; "Intermediate school
degree"; "High school degree". Some respondents are still in school; since their educational
attainment is not necessarily their de￿nitive one, they are omitted from the analysis. I
also omit respondents who have not the German nationality.
The estimated e⁄ect of ability on nationalism is displayed in Table 1. The ￿rst two
columns report results from a binary logit estimation; nationalism is coded as 1 if the
respondent is very proud of being German and 0 otherwise. The remaining columns
report estimations from an ordered logit model.
TABLE 1: Binary and ordered logit regressions predicting nationalism in
DJI data.
13(1) (2) (1￿ ) (2￿ )
Age -0.216* -0.258* -0.119* -0.097
(0.086) (0.125) (0.055) (0.084)
Age squared 0.004* 0.005 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Female -0.470*** -0.507*** -0.419*** -0.437***
(0.052) (0.066) (0.031) (0.041)
Low education 0.359*** 0.330*** 0.200*** 0.238***
(0.057) (0.067) (0.040) (0.046)
High education -0.730*** -0.520*** -0.734*** -0.560***
(0.068) (0.093) (0.036) (0.050)
Wave 1997 0.120* 0.108 0.125*** 0.102*
(0.061) (0.073) (0.037) (0.047)
Wave 2003 0.010 -0.041 0.246*** 0.210***










Part-time work -0.058 -0.255***
(0.129) (0.075)
Not working -0.028 -0.169**
(0.100) (0.062)
Unemployment Bene￿ts 0.283*** -0.079
(0.081) (0.057)
Bayesian Information Criterion 10,944 7,368 37,060 23,261
Observations 14,583 9,115 14,583 9,117
The results show that educational attainment has a strongly signi￿cant impact on
the degree of nationalism of the German youth. Individuals with low education are
more nationalistic than individuals with intermediate education while individuals with
high education are less nationalistic than individuals with intermediate education. The
implied negative causal e⁄ect of ability on nationalism is consistent with the comparative
statics of the model where optimal strategies are based on parameter constellations that
lead to con￿guration 4, i.e. ability levels are relatively high.
Is nationalism associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants? Table 2 shows
that in the DJI Youth Survey this is clearly the case. Nationalism is strongly corre-
lated with a number of proxies of xenophobia derived from various survey questions. All
14reported correlation coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant at the 1 % level.
TABLE 2: Correlation coe¢ cients for nationalism and various measures
of xenophobia.
Question Correlation with nationalism
If jobs become rare, foreigners should be 0.33
sent to their home countries
Foreigners should have the same rights -0.23
as Germans in all domains
I support the presence of foreigners -0.28
because they enrich own cultural life
It would be best if all foreigners leave 0.30
Germany
It is acceptable: Using violent means to 0.26
make it clear to asylum-seekers that they
should return to their home country
This evidence is in line with recent ￿ndings by Card et al. (2009) on the determinants
of attitudes towards immigration in a sample of twenty-two European countries. They
￿nd that "compositional amenities" - associated with the non-economic consequences of
immigration - are substantially more important in explaining attitudes than concerns
over the impacts of immigration on wages and taxes. Moreover, those amenity e⁄ects are
especially strong in case of attitudes of less-educated individuals.
4.2 ISSP
The "National Identity 2003" module of the International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP) covers most OECD countries; it samples about 45,000 adult individuals. An ad-
vantage of this data source as compared to the DJI Survey is that educational attainment
is more ￿nely coded according to the following six categories: "No education"; "Primary
education", "Some secundary education", Secundary education", "Above secundary edu-
cation", "Tertiary education". Regression results are exhibited in Table 3. Again, the ￿rst
two columns report results from a binary logit estimation and the two other columns re-
port estimations from an ordered logit model. All regressions include unreported country
dummies; standard errors are adjusted for clustering by country of the respondent.
TABLE 3: Binary and ordered logit regressions predicting nationalism in
ISSP data.
15(1) (2) (1￿ ) (2￿ )
No education 0.137 0.137 0.110 0.117
(0.153) (0.150) (0.143) (0.143)
Primary education 0.161*** 0.158*** 0.147*** 0.145***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038)
Secundary education -0.179*** -0.175*** -0.171*** -0.171***
(0.045) (0.044) (0.034) (0.034)
Above secundary education -0.271*** -0.261*** -0.249*** -0.241***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.047) (0.047)
Tertiary education -0.590*** -0.581*** -0.524*** -0.524***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.061) (0.062)
Age 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.002 0.012 0.026 0.044
























Bayesian Information Criterion 49,663 49,198 76,689 75,890
Observations 41,470 41,033 41,470 41,033
Note: All regressions include country dummies.
The omitted education category is "Some secundary education". For higher educa-
16tional attainments, the results show again a negative relationship between education and
nationalism. That negative relationship extends to those with only "Primary education",
who are found to be more nationalistic than those with "Some secundary education".
However, at even lower attainments ("No education") there is no statistically signi￿cant
e⁄ect of education on nationalism, i.e. the nationalism of individuals with no education
seems to be closer to that of individuals with some secundary education than to that of
individuals with only primary education.13
4.3 WVS
The third data souce is the World Value Survey in its waves 1989-1993, 1994-1999, 1999-
2004 and 2005. The distinctive advantage of this source is that it includes many developing
countries where educational attainment is relatively low; the sample has more than 250,000
observations.
TABLE 4: Binary and ordered logit regressions predicting nationalism in
WVS data.
13In this data source there is a survey question directly related to the relative value assigned to the
respondent￿ s country. Individuals were asked whether they agree with the following statement: "Gen-
erally speaking, [COUNTRY] is a better country than most other countries". Answers are signi￿cantly
correlated with the nationalism proxy used in the regressions, with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.33.
17(1) (2) (1￿ ) (2￿ )
No education -0.054 -0.044 -0.061 -0.048
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Primary education 0.096** 0.089** 0.099** 0.095**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Secundary education -0.118*** -0.125*** -0.122*** -0.127***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Tertiary education -0.263*** -0.254*** -0.261*** -0.259***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Female -0.048* -0.058** -0.018 -0.025
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age -0.004 -0.008* -0.004 -0.009**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***






















Bayesian Information Criterion 288,413 273,944 437,616 418,263
Observations 249,416 236,912 249,416 236,912
Note: All regressions include country and wave dummies.
Table 4 con￿rms the results from the above analyses. The declining part of the hump-
shaped relationship between ability and nationalism put forward by the theoretical model
is clearly detectable in the data, while there is some weak evidence in support of the
increasing part of that relationship.
18The last wave of the WVS includes information about the nationality of the respon-
dents￿parents. According to the theoretical approach proposed in this paper, foreign
parents of naturalized individuals are predicted to induce less nationalism because they
are unlikely to endorse it in ￿rst place - their ￿ is lower, i.e. it is more costly for them
to instill nationalism. Furthermore, socialization may have taken place behind a veil of
ignorance, i.e. before migration; this may also imply a lower degree of nationalism for
children of foreign parents. Table 5 presents regression results when parent￿ s immigrant
status is controlled for. Consistently with expectations, immigrated parents seem to lower
their children￿ s degree of nationalism. Moreover, individuals with no education are found
to be signi￿cantly less nationalistic than individuals with some secundary education. This
lends some empirical support to the increasing part of the relationship between ability
and nationalism put forward by the theoretical model.
TABLE 5: Binary and ordered logit regressions predicting nationalism in
WVS data, wave 2005.
19(1) (2) (1￿ ) (2￿ )
No education -0.204*** -0.181*** -0.227*** -0.204***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Primary education 0.063* 0.074* 0.067* 0.082**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Secundary education -0.086** -0.082** -0.078** -0.075**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Tertiary education -0.220*** -0.218*** -0.226*** -0.227***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Female -0.086*** -0.082*** -0.059** -0.054**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
One Parent Immigrant -0.196*** -0.187** -0.183** -0.175**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Both Parents Immigrants -0.205*** -0.094 -0.192*** -0.097*






















Bayesian Information Criterion 61,509 59,043 87,559 84,618
Observations 53,592 51,483 53,592 51,483
Note: All regressions include country dummies.
205 Conclusion
Interpersonal relations are embedded in the judgements associated with the social cate-
gories that individuals perceive in their fellow human beings. The nature of those judg-
ments can be explained by a theory of symbolic values where agents, e.g. parents, ra-
tionally shape individual value systems under some constraints. Using that theoretical
framework, I have developed a simple model of relations between natives and immigrants
where value of own nationality and disvalue of di⁄erent ethnicity are endogenously deter-
mined. In that model, the formation of value associated with the inherited ethnic trait
interacts with the transmission of value attached to an endogenous achievement trait.
Values generate economic incentives and are a⁄ected by them. Individuals who are less
likely to achieve are predicted to invest more value on nationalism and to have hostile
relations with immigrants. Multiple equilibria are possible and more e⁄ective schooling
may eliminate equilibria with xenophobia. Econometric ￿ndings from three large surveys
corroborate the predictions derived from the theoretical model about the relationship
between ability and nationalism.
Di⁄erently from the US, there is no "European dream" on which European countries
can rely to foster the assimilation of immigrants into their societies. This does not mean
that immigrants in Europe are condemned to live apart from the rest of society - like the
black population that lives in US ghettos. Between assimilation and ghettization there ex-
ists a whole spectrum of social interactions between natives and immigrants characterized
by some integration of the two groups. Integration is a two-sided process. A prerequisite
of it is some mutual respect of the identity of the other group. Without mutual esteem,
spatial and social segregation are likely to persist. This paper has argued that the im-
provement of human abilities through better schools has a positive impact on mutual
respect and contributes to reduce interethnic con￿ ict. The argument does not rely upon
a Victorian view of schools as intruments to improve character, but on the self-interest
of agents who socialize their children. The novel idea put forward by the model is that
investing resources to increase the cognitive ability of low-ability natives may improve the
integration of immigrants in society. Such an investment is predicted to induce parents
of low-ability children to raise their children￿ s perseverance and conscientiousness and to
avoid boosting their self-esteem by transmitting a feeling of national or racial superiority.
In turn, this social change of values will strenghten the incentive for immigrants to invest
in their and their children￿ s human capital.
21APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Since parents￿and children￿ s interests are perfecty aligned and
their information sets are identical, an agent￿ s optimal strategy simply is to maximize (4)
with respect to the three control variables e, ￿n and ￿a. To begin with, notice that the
optimal strategy entails ￿
￿
n ￿ 0 for a domestic citizen (￿
￿
n ￿ 0 for an immigrant). Suppose
by way of contradiction that the optimal socialization of a domestic citizen entails ￿
￿
n < 0.

















which contradicts the assertion that ￿
￿
n < 0.
The four mutually exclusive possible solutions are as follows.
Con￿guration 1: ￿
￿
n > 0, ￿
￿
a < 0, e￿ = 0.
The FOCs are in this case:
@E[U]
@￿a




























while the corner solution e￿ = 0 requires
(wH ￿ wL) + ￿(b v11 ￿ b v01 + 2￿
￿
a) + ￿(socv11 ￿ socv01) ￿ 0:




￿￿[(1 ￿ 2￿)￿ ￿ 2￿￿]










n > 0, ￿
￿
a < 0, e￿ > 0.
The associated FOCs are
@E[U]
@￿a
= [2(￿ + ￿e


















(￿w + ￿(b v11 ￿ b v01) + ￿￿ d socv)(￿ + ￿ + ￿) + 2￿￿
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n > 0, ￿
￿
a = 0, e￿ > 0.
The FOCs are (7) and (5). The corner solution ￿
￿
a = 0 requires
[2(￿ + ￿e























n > 0, ￿
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Simple algebraic manipulations show that the eight remaining possible con￿gurations
can never be optimal. QED
23Proof of Proposition 2: Equilibrium existence follows from standard theorems of ex-
istence of Nash equilibrium for nonatomic games, see e.g. Rath (1992). Equilibrium
multiplicity can be ruled out for ￿ = 0, while standard social-multiplier arguments show
that for ￿ su¢ ciently large multiple equilibria arise. QED
Proof of Proposition 3: For later use, de￿ne
￿ ￿ wH ￿ wL + ￿(b v11 ￿ b v01) + ￿(socv11 ￿ socv01)
and denote by
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿ + ￿
4￿￿
2!(￿ + ￿)
the largest possible value of ￿
2.
Con￿guration 1: Parameter restrictions are necessary to guarantee ￿
￿
a < 0 and e￿ =
0. If ￿ > 0, the condition for e￿ = 0 is necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of
con￿guration 1; it can be written as
￿ ￿
2￿￿




This con￿guration only exists if ￿1 > 0, which is assumed to be the case. By di⁄erentiating
(8) one obtains @￿
￿
n=@￿ > 0.
Con￿guration 2: It is easy to check that the parameter restriction that implies e￿ > 0
also guarantees ￿
￿
n > 0. That restriction is
￿ > ￿1:
In order for con￿guration 2 to exist, parameters must also guarantee ￿
￿
a < 0. This







As it is easily checked, ￿2(￿
2) > ￿1 if ￿
2 2 (0;￿) and ￿2(￿) = ￿1, which shows that
con￿guration 2 occurs if ￿1 < ￿ < ￿2(￿
2). By di⁄erentiating (10) one obtains @￿
￿
n=@￿ > 0.
Con￿guration 3: Parameter restrictions are only required to ensure that ￿
￿
a = 0.
Condition (12) is equivalent to
￿ ￿ ￿2(￿
2):
Condition (11) is equivalent to
24￿ ￿





As it is easily checked, ￿3(￿
2) > ￿2(￿
2), which shows that con￿guration 3 occurs if ￿2(￿
2) ￿
￿ ￿ ￿3(￿
2). By di⁄erentiating (13) one obtains @￿
￿
n=@￿ = 0.
Con￿guration 4: The parameter restriction for ￿
￿
a > 0 automatically implies e￿ > 0.
Condition ￿
￿
a > 0 is equivalent to
￿ > ￿3(￿
2):
The equilibrium condition ￿
￿
n > 0 requires
￿ <







As it is easily checked, ￿4(￿
2) > ￿3(￿
2) if ￿
2 2 (0;￿) and ￿4(￿) = ￿3(￿), which shows
that con￿guration 4 occurs if ￿3(￿) < ￿ < ￿4(￿
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